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ABSTRACTS 
 
 
PUBLIC WELFARE POLICY FOR PREPARING AGING SOCIETY: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND SWEDEN 
 
By 
Yeonsuk Kim 
 
 
 
 
    Korea was entering the condition of Aged Society after becoming an aging society in 
2000. Now Korea is one of the youngest countries but will be the second oldest one that will 
have about 38% of its elders over 65 by 2050 following Japan with 39%, due to rapid 
population aging. There have been more abundant discussions about social welfare extension 
during the last presidential election. The present administration promised the extension of 
welfare services – most pledges of President Park were related to universal and free welfare 
service including child-care, health-care, and old-age pension. However, the most 
fundamental problem is that the Korean government does not have sufficient financial 
resources to fulfill these pledges.  
 
    Therefore, this report will show some different welfare policies through comparative 
study between Korea and Sweden, because Sweden is known as a well-designed welfare 
model state. From the Swedish welfare model, Korea can learn some lessons. First of all, the 
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well-functioning Swedish Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) and parental leave 
policies will be compared to the Korean case. Secondly, the Swedish patient-oriented health-
care system, Stockholm Model will be introduced. Thirdly, radical pension reform to NDC 
(Notional Defined Contribution) in 1999 – high contribution and high benefit -- will be 
explained. Fourthly, sustainable and transparent fiscal policy and a system of high taxation 
will be also compared to Korean fiscal and tax policies. Finally, the contribution of CSOs 
(Civil Society Organizations), especially Labor Unions (LO) with the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party (SAP) since the Second World War will be compared to the role of Korean 
CSOs. However, Korea should keep in mind that Sweden took a long time, over one hundred 
years, to form its present mature welfare system through several waves of system reform. 
Moreover, the Swedish government, SAP, and LO strongly contributed to form the Swedish 
welfare model with long-term plans and long discussions and debate. 
 
KEYWORDS: Comparative Welfare Study, Korean Welfare Policies, Sweden Welfare 
Policies, Sustainable Welfare Services, Welfare Policies, Child-Care Policies, Health-Care 
Policies, Pension Policies, Fiscal and Tax Policies, The Role of Civil Society Organizations 
.
iii 
 
Table of Index 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
What problems was Korea confronting? ............................................................................................................... 1 
A. Korean Governmental Policies do not have consistency .............................................................................. 3 
1. Are current welfare policies efficient? .............................................................................................................. 3 
2. Do the welfare pledges of the Park administration have enough foundation to fulfill extended welfare? ........ 4 
3. Does the government have enough agreement from the general population to extend welfare service? .......... 5 
B. Koreans have lower trust in the Korean government and politics than Sweden ....................................... 5 
1. Does the government have political will to undertake political reform? .......................................................... 5 
2. Is Korean politics transparent and can people access to governmental documents? ....................................... 6 
3. Do Korean people have high interest in politics? ............................................................................................. 7 
C. Income inequality and polarization were severe, thus Korea needs social cohesion to reduce social 
waste and to unify people ..................................................................................................................................... 7 
1. What do the people want and need? ................................................................................................................. 8 
2. What resources are available to fulfill these wants and needs? ........................................................................ 8 
3. How does the country collect these resources toward fulfillment? ................................................................... 9 
D. Concept and Definition ................................................................................................................................. 10 
1. Aging Society ................................................................................................................................................. 10 
2. Civil Society and Social Capital..................................................................................................................... 11 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................................. 14 
1. Economic Crises and the Welfare State in Korea ......................................................................................... 14 
2. The Aging of Korea ........................................................................................................................................ 16 
3. Three Welfare Policies of President Park Keun-hye .................................................................................... 16 
4. Summary ........................................................................................................................................................ 18 
III. ANALYSIS: COMPARATIVE STUDIES BETWEEN KOREA AND SWEDEN .................................. 19 
A. KOREA .......................................................................................................................................................... 19 
1. Welfare: Child-Care ..................................................................................................................................... 19 
2. Welfare: Health-care .................................................................................................................................... 22 
3. Welfare: Pension ........................................................................................................................................... 25 
4. Fiscal and Tax Policy .................................................................................................................................... 29 
5. The role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) ......................................................................................... 32 
B. SWEDEN ....................................................................................................................................................... 34 
1. Welfare: Child-Care ..................................................................................................................................... 34 
2. Welfare: Health-Care ................................................................................................................................... 37 
3. Welfare: Pension ........................................................................................................................................... 40 
4. Fiscal and Tax Policy .................................................................................................................................... 43 
5. The role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) ......................................................................................... 46 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 48 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………......................................54 
iv 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Major Contents of the Amendment to the National Pension Act ..................................................... 26 
Table 2. Comparison of Financial Prospects before and after the Amendment ............................................ 28 
Table 3. The tax mix in OECD countries .......................................................................................................... 32 
Table 4. Evolution of the Swedish tax structure since the tax reform of 1991 ............................................... 45 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. A Young Korea is about to grow old .................................................................................................. 10 
Figure 2. Average social expenditure by child by intervention as a proportion of median working-age 
household income, 2007 ...................................................................................................................................... 21 
Figure 3. Distribution of public and private spending on early educational institutions ............................. 22 
Figure 4. Swedish Pension System ..................................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 5. Compare between FP and NDC ......................................................................................................... 42 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
LIST OF SYMBOLS OR ABBREVIATIONS 
AGDI Asia Pacific Governance and Democracy Initiative 
ALMP Active Labor Market Programs 
ALOS Average length of stay 
ATP Allmän tilläggspension (general or public supplementary pension) 
CCEJ The Citizen’s Coalition of Economic Justice 
CSN The National Board of Student Aid 
CSO Civil Society Organizations 
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies 
DRG Diagnosis-related Group 
EU European Union 
EC European Commission 
ECEC Early Childhood Education and Care Policy 
EITC Earned Income Tax Credit 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HiT The Health System in Transition 
ILM Levels of Labor Mobility 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
ITP Industrins och handelns tilläggspension (negotiated pension system for 
certain groups of employees) 
KERI Korea Economic Research Institute 
KIRI Korea Insurance Research Institute 
LO The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 
Labor Union) 
MEST The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology  
MHW The Ministry of Health and Welfare 
NDC Notional Defined Contribution 
NPS National Pension Service 
NSIB National Social Insurance Board 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PROST the World Bank’s Pension Reform Options Software Toolkit 
PAYG pay-as-you-go 
PSPD The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy 
SCHU Soonchunhyang University 
KOSTAT Statistics Korea 
KOSIS Korean Statistical Information Service 
KEI Korea Economic Institute 
RFV National Social Insurance Board [Riksförsäkringsverket] 
SACO The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges 
Akademikers Centralorganisation) 
SAP Swedish Social Democratic Party 
SAF Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
TCO The Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens 
Centralorganisation) 
TI Transparency International 
 
 
１ 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012 there were much more abundant discussions about social welfare in the 
Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) than in past years, while Korea was having the 
presidential election and general election. Korea has taken about 20 years to enter the 
condition of Aged Society after becoming an Aging Society in 2000, while most advanced 
countries have spent at least over a half-century to move from Aging Society to Aged 
Society.1 Due to population aging,2 the social structure of Korea has, more and more, 
become a malformed type of pyramid. Population aging itself has generated many challenges 
and concerns about economic growth and welfare service such as pensions and health-care 
for the future.3 Thus, the Korean Government has announced several policies to enhance the 
birth rate and to guarantee a minimum cost of living 4  for the poor. However, the 
effectiveness of these policies could not reach people’s expectation, and showed limitations, 
while some poor people never received financial support from the Korean Government.  
 
In 2012, the presidential election was a reflection of the interest of the public about 
welfare; pledges for welfare among presidential candidates were hot issues. However, the 
fundamental problem is that the Korean administration does not have sufficient financial 
resources to put its pledges into practice in the new Park Keun-Hye administration, which 
                                                          
1 The United Nations classifies societies by the proportion of total population over 65 years old into three 
groups: if the proportion of 7-14%, it is called Aging Society; if 14-21%, called Aged Society; if 21% or more, 
called Hyper-Aged Society. http://wisdom.unu.edu/en/ageing-societies/.  
2 The life expectancy of human beings was longer, and the fertility rate was lower with modern medical 
developments, but the birth rate was becoming much lower, which was the lowest level in Korea that could not 
reach to the average one among OECD countries. 
3 David E.Bloom, Axel Boersch-Supan, Patrick McGee and Stsushi Seike, “Population Aging: Facts, 
Challenges, and Responses,” PGDA Working Paper, no. 71 (2011): 4, 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/pgda/working.htm. 
4 The Minister of Health and Welfare in Korea announces that “the minimum cost of living means the lowest 
possible costs for people to maintain a healthy and civilized way of living. It is measured every three years.” 
http://english.mw.go.kr. 
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took office on 25 February 2013.5 The new government will need at least 135 trillion won to 
support her welfare pledges during her 5 years administration.6 Therefore, this thesis will 
show what will be needed in Korea’s Aging Society to retain stable financial resources and to 
set sustainable welfare services in macro-view point through the comparative study of 
policies between Korea and Sweden. 
 
What problems was Korea confronting? 
Korea has achieved “rapid growth during the first decade of the 21st century,” but 
income inequality has further increased since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis because of the 
globalized economy.7 OECD in 2011 said, 
Korea is confronting a serious challenge. It has to improve income equality in the 
context of severe demographic transition. [Such] transition, from one of the 
youngest populations in the OECD at present to the second oldest by 2050, may 
boost the need for public spending and slow economic growth. While structural 
reforms are indispensable to achieve sustainable growth, Korea also has important 
social challenges to address. Growth is important but growth alone will not solve 
all problems. 8 
Therefore, not only is the necessity of extending welfare an inevitable task, but also this task 
needs a long-term plan – it does not finish with the current 5 years administration, because it 
has a more complicated intergenerational relationship – from the current generation to future 
generations.  
                                                          
5 Her main pledges are to support maximum 200,000 won for young children below 5 years old, to increase old-
age pension amount for every elder over 65 to 2 times, maximum 200,000 won, and to offer free health-care 
service for people with four critical diseases including cancer and cardiac disease.  
6 The Korea Times, “[Editorial] Tax and welfare,” Feb 19, 2013, 
http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/issues/2013/02/139_130734.html. 
7 OECD.2011, “A framework for growth and social cohesion in Korea,” OECD Publishing, (2011):3, 
http://www.oecd.org/korea/48225033.pdf. 
8 OECD.2011, “Growth and Social Cohesion,” (2011): 3, 5. 
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Sweden, known as a well-designed welfare model state, took a long time, over one 
hundred years, to form its present welfare model during which time has experienced many 
trials and errors. In contrast, Korea accelerated its economic development to reconstruct 
broken Korean society since the Korean War in 1950, so the Korean Government did not 
have enough room to consider advanced welfare service for a while. 
 
A. Korean Governmental Policies do not have consistency 
Korean politicians have misused governmental policies as a way to get more votes from 
the people during election campaigns, and these policies have frequently changed with each 
administration by its governing party. However, Sweden made a fixed foundation for welfare, 
while it has kept consistency of policies for over 40 years with the concept, ‘the house of the 
people’ introduced by Per Albin Hansson,9 even as the Swedish governing party has changed.  
 
1. Are current welfare policies efficient? 
Korea has introduced several welfare systems from child-care and health-care to 
pensions, but their effectiveness is questionable. Whenever the administration has changed, 
the governmental policies have not continued through to the next administration. This has a 
direct relation with Korean political culture. Most politicians have made many pledges to 
obtain more votes, but most of pledges have been empty ones for several decades and these 
could not be achievable. The last presidential election was not exceptional. The higher the 
number of these empty pledges has increased, the lower Koreans’ trust in lawmakers has 
dropped. Moreover, Korea had no proper processes or organizations to verify politicians’ 
pledges. Thus, most pledges were made within a very short period without sufficient 
                                                          
9 Per Albin Hansson was Swedish Prime Minister (1932~46) and he made the concept “people’s home.” 
Takayoshi Kitaoka, 복지강국 스웨덴, 경쟁력의 비밀, trans. Choi, Ryejin, Wisdomhouse Press, (2012): 69-
70. 
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preparation or discussion, and this finally caused the next hot debate among people or ended 
up wasting money.  
 
2. Do the welfare pledges of the Park administration have enough foundation to 
fulfill extended welfare? 
The representative welfare pledges of President Park include extending child-care 
service for every child under 5 years, 2-times increase of pension amount (200,000 won) for 
everyone over 65, and free health-care for people with 4 critical diseases.10 But, experts in 
several industries said that the plan of President Park called for KRW 135 trillion for 5 years, 
she had too optimistic an outlook, and budgets for economic growth were absurdly 
insufficient because budgets for welfare this year were over 70% of national total budget. 
President Park said that some of the needed financial resources can be obtained from the 
underground economy, but John Power at the Korea Times said that returns from the 
underground economy (about 20% of GDP) were unclear:  
It will be dependent upon how much efforts will be devoted by the tax 
administration in investigating hidden and disguised transactions and detecting the 
underreported and concealed tax base.11  
Thus, professionals claimed that a tax increase is inevitable to obtain additional money 
needed to fulfill these programs.  
 
                                                          
10 “Included among Park’s pledges—252 in all—are a doubling of monthly pensions to 200,000 won ($US187) 
for those over 65 years old, full medical coverage for sufferers of four major medical conditions—
cerebrovascular and cardiac disorders, cancer, and terminal illnesses—free day care for children under five, and 
expanding basic social security, which currently provides very limited financial assistance to only a fraction of 
those in need.” Ben McGrath, “South Korean president-elect moves to abandon welfare promises,” World 
Socialist Web Site, February 05, 2013, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/02/05/kore-f05.html. 
11 John Power, “[Voice] How much tax can Park squeeze out of the underground economy?,” The Korea 
Herald, January 28, 2013, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130128000918. 
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3. Does the government have enough agreement from the general population to 
extend welfare service? 
Park’s pledges, especially for elders over 65, helped her win the presidential election and 
these also motivated voters over 50 to participate to give her a vote. The Park administration 
after winning announced revised welfare policies for the pension prepared by the 
‘Presidential Transition Team’ several times. However, it brought hot debates among people 
because the government spurred NPS’s voluntary subscribers who were mostly housewives, 
and fostered distrust of NPS among the general populations.12 This is a natural result because 
the government did not try to get agreement from the people, over what structural reforms or 
policy reform -- especially NPS reform -- will be needed.  
 
B. Koreans have lower trust in the Korean government and politics than Sweden 
Swedish people have high interest in politics and the election generally shows over 80% 
participation. In contrast, Korean people have relatively low election participation compared 
to Sweden. The Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion on Feb. 2013 conducted a survey, 
and in this poll, the National Assembly recorded just 5.6% trust among 2,000 adults, the 
lowest percent among several items: Government (15.8%), Court (15.7%), Police (20%), 
Media (16.8%), and Financial Institutions (28.5%). It means 72.8% of respondents did not 
believe policymakers. This is why Korean politics has to be changed and be reformed. 
 
1. Does the government have political will to undertake political reform? 
In last general election, most candidates for National Assembly seats and parties 
promised that they will give up certain privileges given to policymakers and abolish ‘the Act 
                                                          
12 NPS (National Pension System) was introduced in 1988. http://www.nps.or.kr/jsppage/main.jsp. 
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of pension for lawmakers’.13 But, most policymakers belonging to the ruling party and the 
opposition parties passed the bill for policymakers’ pension after the end of the general 
election. This clearly showed they have no political will to undertake political reform, 
because they do not want to give up their special privileges14 – about 30 special rights. These 
activities of lawmakers have caused Koreans to have low trust in the National Assembly and 
politics and there was no political improvement until now. In contrast, Swedish policymakers 
do not have any special privileges; they generally have civic rights and responsibilities the 
same as the general citizens, and they regard the position of lawmaker itself as one of the 
usual occupations. 
 
2. Is Korean politics transparent and can people access to governmental documents? 
Korea ranked 43 with a score of 5.4 on the 2011 International Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI)15 among 183 countries, while most Northern European countries ranked at top 
levels: Finland (3), Sweden (4), and Denmark (2).16 This index shows that Korean politics is 
not transparent and the Korean Government cannot get trust from the people because of 
corruption, for example the high bribery index. In general, ordinary people cannot access all 
government’s public documents. But, Sweden passed a bill, the ‘Public Information Act’, in 
1766 and this Act had “the key achievements,” to abolish “political censorship” and to gain 
“public access to government documents.” 17 Thus, every Swedish citizen can access public 
                                                          
13 Tae-hwa Kang and Myo-ja Ser, “Lawmakers studied plans for sweetheart,” Korea JoongAng Daily, January 
11, 2013, http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965342. 
14 ‘The Act of pension for lawmakers’ was first introduced to give money to retired lawmakers in 1988. At first, 
200,000 won was paid to them, but the amount was increase 6 times in 2012. The problem is policymakers have 
no contribution, but they get monthly money for free. It became hot issue and was debating. But, Japan 
abolished this bill in 2006. http://article.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=10381720. 
15 CPI is Corruption Perceptions Index, and is measured by TI (Transparency International). TI is one of the 
global civil society organizations and fights against corruption. 
16 TI, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2011,” Transparency International, 2011. 
17 Anders Chydenius, The World’s First Freedom of Information Act, The Anders Chydenius Foundation, (2006): 
4, http://www.access-info.org/documents/Access_Docs/Thinking/Get_Connected/worlds_first_foia.pdf.  
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documents and have the right to ask explanation of policymakers. These are big differences 
between Korea and Sweden.18  
 
3. Do Korean people have high interest in politics? 
Many surveys show that Korean people have low interest in politics. Korea’s average 
election rate was not high compared to Sweden. Many Korean politicians have abused their 
pledges as a political method to win an election, and they have broken promises with the 
people for several decades. The expectation of most Koreans about politicians has been 
shattered without fail because lawmakers did not keep their original pledges. These trends 
have pervaded Korean society for a long time. At the end of each administration, senior 
public servants, lawmakers or presidential relatives go to jail because of corruption caused by 
the cozy relations between politics and business. 19  As these accumulated, the people 
gradually lost interest in politics.  
 
C. Income inequality and polarization were severe, thus Korea needs social 
cohesion to reduce social waste and to unify people 
As Korea held two elections last year, a general election and a presidential election, the 
people divided into two major groups, the Saenuri Party and the Democratic Party. Besides, 
while Korea has focused on enhancing economic growth since IMF imposed reforms in 
1997-8, income inequality has become deeper due to Korea’s dualistic labor market between 
regular and non-regular workers, and the gap between the poor and the rich has grown wider. 
Due to these problems, social and economic waste has generally increased, and the efficiency 
in public spending decreased; the social safety net cannot achieve its role, and this has 
                                                          
18 Kitaoka, Welfare Country Sweden, (2012):177. 
19 From Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations to Lee Myung-Bak 
administration. 
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resulted in a rising crime rate. Therefore, before extending welfare services, Korea must 
reduce social waste and mitigate income inequality through social cohesion.  
 
1. What do the people want and need? 
Korea’s economy achieved quick recovery since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, but 
discrimination against non-regular workers has kept increasing because of cost saving and 
companies’ emphasis on employment flexibility since the 1997-8 IMF crisis. Income 
inequality between regular and non-regular workers has grown larger, and the unemployment 
rate has kept increasing: temporary jobs and polarization between the-haves and not the-
haves have increased; the unemployment rate of 20-30s was bigger than other age groups 
because 80% of high school graduates go to college. The quality of people’s life has dropped 
and the life after retirement could not be guaranteed, while this vicious circle keeps going. 
Therefore, most people want to get more stable jobs, to raise their children in a better 
environment, to save money for their post-retirement, to transfer to a regular job from a non-
regular one, to get more welfare services for child-care, health-care, and pension from the 
Korean Government, and to live a happy life.  
 
2. What resources are available to fulfill these wants and needs? 
First of all, political will is very important to fulfill these needs – for instance, structural 
reform or policy reform. OECD recommended the importance of social cohesion in Korea 
several times and President Park emphasized the necessity of ‘social cohesion’ at her 
presidential inauguration. Social cohesion really requires public interest and participation. 
Furthermore, social cohesion needs public spending, and public spending essentially requires 
financial resources. Extending welfare service also needs structural reform to get more 
money through the increased jobs or tax increase. The presidential transition team was to set 
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a ‘new committee on tax reform’ to fund additional money before Park’s inauguration, even 
though President Park stated her intention not to increase tax. Human resources are crucial 
factors for Korea’s future. President Park stressed the importance of education to fulfill 
people’s dreams and opening a new era of hope, according to the Korea Times. In general, 
Koreans are less interested in politics than Swedes. Enhancing the trust of the people in the 
government and politicians is essential to unify the Korean people and to increase financial 
resources in the long term: the higher trust will reduce social and economic waste and 
increase efficiency; ultimately, corruption committed by politicians will be diminished and 
social cohesion will be easily achieved. The process for social cohesion will be the 
foundation for Korea to form a well-functioned and sound welfare society in the long run. 
 
3. How does the country collect these resources toward fulfillment? 
In Sweden, civil society, especially labor unions, undertook critical and diverse roles to 
form the present Swedish welfare model over a long time. Swedish people among European 
countries show high interest in politics and high election participation, over 80% on average. 
Sweden had achieved huge economic growth as a neutral nation during the Second World 
War and this became the foundation for Sweden to focus on forming its welfare system while 
other countries were fighting the war. Sweden has undertaken policy reforms several times in 
every policy arena while experiencing many trials and errors for over one hundred years. 
Most Swedish citizens are satisfied with their lives; high contributions and high benefits – the 
tax rate is close to 50%, the top level in OECD countries. In contrast, Koreans show low trust 
to the government, low interest in politics, and a weak role of civil society compared to 
Sweden. Korea can learn lessons how to fulfill several resources through in-depth analysis of 
Sweden welfare system. 
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D. Concept and Definition 
 
1. Aging Society 
The United Nations defines societies by the proportion of total population over 65 years 
old: if the proportion is 7-14%, it is called an “Aging society”; if 14-21%, it is called an 
“Aged society”; if 21% or more, it is called a “Hyper-aged-society.” Most OECD countries 
were already experiencing many problems caused by population aging. Korea in 2010 was 
one of the youthful countries, but with the rapid demographic transition, Korea will be the 
second oldest nation with 38% elderly following Japan (39%) in 2050, “according to the 
latest government projection [(Figure 1)].”20  
 
Figure 1. A Young Korea is about to grow old 
 
Source: KNSO (2006) and UN (2005) 
                                                          
20 Neil Howe, Richard Jackson and Keisuke Nakashima, “THE AGING OF KOREA: Demographics and 
Retirement Policy in the Land of the Morning Calm,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007:2. 
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Korea’s fertility rate has fallen from 6.0 in 1960 to 1.1 in 2006 since the five year 
economic plan due to the government’s demographic policy and this is the lowest level in the 
world. With a continuous decline in population, Korea’s workforce will keep declining in 
number, having peaked in 2018. Finally, “Koreans aged 20 to 64” will be 34 percent by 2050.  
 
    Modern medical advancement and nutrition improvement has also led to increased life 
expectancy and to a falling mortality rate. Life expectancy has sharply increased from 50 in 
1955 to 79 in 2005 and this in 2005 was higher than US (77.7), UK (78.4) and Germany 
(78.6).21 “The poverty rate of the elderly is 45%, well above the OECD average of 13%.”22 
As the population ages, social spending for elders such as health care and lifelong care keeps 
increasing as in other advanced countries, but the workforce falls at the same time. In the end, 
“tomorrow’s elders will be more in need of financial resources than today.”23 In short, now 
Korea is confronting many challenges due to its aging wave; early retirement age (55 at most 
firms), growing aging population, slow economic growth, fewer workers, declining national 
savings, and increasing public social spending.  
 
2. Civil Society and Social Capital 
    About two decades ago, while non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society 
representatives in labor-, religion-, and other sectors “play[ed] critical and diverse roles in 
societal development,” civil society was viewed as voluntary associations in a “third 
sector.”24 However, these days the definitions of civil society are becoming much wider, 
more dynamic, and vibrant, “encompassing far more than a mere ‘sector,’” while the 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 9. 
22 OECD.2011, “Growth and Social Cohesion,” (2011):20. 
23 Howe, “The Aging of Korea,” (2007):13. 
24 “Third Sector” means “voluntary or non-profit sector of an economy; described by Jim Joseph (President, 
Council On Foundations) as ‘an intermediary space between business and government were private energy can 
be deployed for public good.’” http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/third-sector.html.  
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boundaries between civil society sectors blur: between organized and unorganized, or 
between online and offline.25 Online civil society activity is significantly growing thanks to 
information and communication technology (ICT). With the change of the external 
environment for civil society, the partnership between civil society groups and business, and 
governments have been broadened. For instance, according to the definition of civil society 
the World Bank, civil society is: 
[T]he wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a 
presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or 
others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations. Civil society organizations therefore refer to a wide array of 
organizations: community groups, NGOs, labour unions, indigenous groups, 
charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and 
foundations.26 
 
As the recognition that every sector essentially needs cooperation with other ones to 
solve major societal issues is increasing, the roles of civil society are becoming more 
powerful. The engagement in partnerships between civil society and business, government, or 
international organizations is becoming broad and solid. Therefore, civil society has diverse 
roles: as a watchdog, advocate, service provider, expert, capacity builder, incubator, 
representative, citizenship champion, solidarity supporter, and definer of standards. Civil 
society actors “aim to improve social cohesion” based on social capital, which include social 
trust or faith, norms, religious cultures, social media communities and networks. 27  
 
                                                          
25 Economic Forum, “The Future Role of Civil Society,” (2013): 5. 
26 World Economic Forum, “The Future Role of Civil Society,” (2013): 8. 
27 Ibid., 8-9. 
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    Civil society cannot avoid touching individual matters in philosophy, culture, religion, 
socio-economic, and political arenas. CSOs try to improve social cohesion; mitigate poverty 
and inequality in gender and income, improve the social safety net and human rights, protect 
the environment, and provide better welfare and education services. They make an effort “to 
reduce societal harms and increase societal benefits.” These activities of CSOs are ultimately 
connected to strengthening of common good through social sympathy and regard between 
citizens.28  
 
  
                                                          
28 Ibid., 8. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Three Empirical Studies about Welfare 
This report introduces three empirical studies about welfare. These studies investigate 
key issues Korea has confronted and present recommendations or challenges with in-depth 
and qualitative information. The three studies deal with several topics, including economic 
crisis, labor market changes, welfare issues such as child-care; health-care; and pension. 
Firstly, the journal article ‘Economic Crises and the Welfare State in Korea’ written by Kwon 
Hyuk-ju et al. compared the differences between applied policies during the economic crisis 
in Korea – 1997-8 IMF crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. Secondly, Howe et al. in 
THE AGING OF KOREA stated that Korea was becoming an aging society and confronting 
many future challenges such as the retirement crisis. Lastly, Yang in his journal article, 
‘Current Issues and Political Advice of Park Keun-hye Administration: Welfare’ stated the 
issues of her main welfare pledges and recommendations. In conclusion, this literature review 
will explain why these reports should be studied and what this paper will differ.  
 
1. Economic Crises and the Welfare State in Korea 
Kwon described in his journal article “Economic Crises and the Welfare State in Korea” 
that Korea has responded in the context of welfare policies during two times of economic 
crisis: the 1997-8 Asian economic crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis.29 In his journal 
article he showed two different welfare policies during Kim Dae-Jung’s administration and 
Lee Myung-Bak’s government. President Kim implemented pro-welfare policies while 
extending and strengthening welfare services during the 1997-8 Asian economic crisis, but 
Lee Myung-bak’s government focused on increasing jobs in response to the 2008 subprime 
                                                          
29 Huck-ju Kwon, Grami Dong and Hyun-gyung Moon, “Economic Crises and the Welfare State in Korea: 
Reforms and Future Challenges,” The Korean Journal of Policy Studies, 25, no. 1, (2010):175. 
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mortgage crisis. As Kwon notes, the IMF crisis in 1997-8 forcibly made Korea undertake 
economic reform and labor market reform,30 and the Kim Dae-Jung administration extended 
social policy reform to protect the poor and the vulnerable through a “Labor-Employers-
Government committee.” 31  Thanks to his progressive welfare policies, “one public 
assistance program (the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee)” was introduced, and several 
welfare programs from insurance to pensions were extended. 32  In contrast, the Lee 
“government has put effort into retaining existing jobs and creating new jobs in the labor 
market and temporary jobs through public works”33 since the 2008 global financial crisis, 
while financially supporting SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) and young people.34 As 
Kwon pointed out, social insurance spending -- Employment Insurance, Public Pension, and 
National Health Insurance -- was higher during the Lee government due to rising 
unemployment. Overall, he evaluated President Kim’s welfare policies as well-functioning 
because “social spending’s proportion of total government spending has remained at almost 
the same level as in the last ten years.”35 As a result, Kwon suggested that the need for 
extending welfare will be higher in future because “of dramatic demographic transitions and 
change in family structure.” The current Korean welfare system is not sufficient to cover 
future “challenges for social protection and economic development.36  
 
                                                          
30 Labor market policy reform was inevitable due to1997-8 IMF crisis, and non-regular workers were increased 
with the reason ‘cost savings and labor flexibility.’  
31 The Labor-Employers-Government Committee was established by Kim Dae-Jung government after 1997-8 
economic crisis “to produce a broad-based social consensus for economic reform while strengthening the 
welfare state.” Kwon, “Economic Crises and the Welfare State,” (2010):180. 
32 Five insurance programs were extended - IAI(Industrial Accident Insurance (introduced in 1961)), 
NHI(National Health Insurance (introduced in 1977)), NPP(National Pension Program (introduced in 1988)), 
EIP(Employment Insurance Program (introduced in 1995)), and LTC(Long-Term Care Insurance (introduced in 
2008)), and pension system was categorized by people; “civil servants, private school teachers, and military 
personnel.” Kwon, “Economic Crises and the Welfare State,” (2010):181. 
33 Lee Myung-Bak government introduced “public works program for people just above the poverty line the 
Huimang (dream) project” to create temporary jobs. Kwon, “Economic Crises and the Welfare State,” 
(2010):184. 
34 Kwon, “Economic Crises and the Welfare State,” (2010):185. 
35 Ibid., 187. 
36 Ibid., 190. 
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2.  The Aging of Korea 
In the well-researched book THE AGING OF KOREA, Howe asked what solutions are 
needed to deal with the “age wave” in Korea. The book pointed out that Korea is facing 
“rapid aging and rapid development” at the same time, and NPS is so weak and unsustainable 
that “most dependent elders” cannot live alone. Moreover, Korea “ha[s] grown accustomed to 
middle-class living standards.”37 Howe stated that only one Korean worker may support each 
retired elder by 2050, because the population rate of elderly over 65 will reach 38% -- it is the 
second highest level following Japan (39%) in 2050. Therefore, Howe strongly recommended 
that the reform of Korean retirement system is inevitable to reduce the future generation’s 
burden and to cover financial support of rising elders through boosting “fully funded personal 
retirement accounts.”38 Overall, Howe made two kinds of recommendations. Most of all, this 
book emphasized the reform of NPS system with quantitative figures, while pointing out the 
inefficiency of the NPS system. Next, the realignment of “the traditional social norms” is 
necessary “to meet the challenges of an aging society.” These challenges referred by Howe 
are longer work lives for elders, keeping balance between jobs and babies for women, and 
care for elders.39  
 
3. Three Welfare Policies of President Park Keun-hye 
    Yang in his journal article, “Current Issues and Political Advice of Park Keun-hye 
Administration: Welfare,” pointed out that three main welfare pledges of the President Park 
have several issues. The first is the expansion of child-care service for every child under 5 
years old regardless of income level. However, it could not contribute to increasing women’s 
labor force participation and low birth rate because her pledge did not consider double-
                                                          
37 Howe, “The Aging of Korea,” (2007):2-3. 
38 Ibid., 5, 29. 
39 Ibid., 35. 
１７ 
 
income families. Most Korean child-care centers prefer the child of full-time mothers who 
usually choose short-term child-care service. In contrast, every child of a double-income 
family in Sweden has priority to use public child-care services, and the children of non-
working mothers are prohibited to access public child-care services. The second issue is that 
non-working mothers can receive full-day care subsidy for an infant aged 0, receiving about 
800,000 won per month. But, in Sweden the child aged 0 cannot get public child-care service, 
because the baby needs its mother’s care. The last issue is that parents may receive a double 
subsidy. He suggested reinforcement of guidelines to protect against double payment, the 
extension of public child-care service, and the introduction of child-care allowances. 
 
    President Park’s second pledge is the extension of pension for all people over 65; it 
means that every person can get 200,000 won per month regardless income or property level. 
The first issue of pension extension is to change to universal pension for all people over 65. 
This is opposite the trend in Sweden, because Sweden reformed its pension from universal to 
a guaranteed pension system to keep sustainable welfare services for aging population. The 
second issue is that the amount of subsidy has to be considered because pension extension 
itself cannot help to poor persons. Yang claimed that pension for persons must focus on the 
poor and thus increase the subsidy to over 300,000 won. 
 
   The last pledge is that everyone with four critical diseases can get free health care. 
President Park estimated these diseases need yearly 1.5 trillion won, but the real cost will be 
several times more because of the increase of unexpected medical demands. Yang suggested 
that even someone who has a critical disease should pay at least a minimum service charge to 
prevent moral hazard.  
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4. Summary 
In summary, Kwon in his journal article showed the necessity of welfare extension with 
a comparative study of two economic crises. Next, Howe et al. well explained many 
problems caused by population aging and gave recommendations to reform the NPS system. 
Lastly, Yang pointed out several issues of President Park’s main welfare pledges and advice 
for policies. As these three authors stated, Korea has several unsolved tasks – child-care 
reform, health-care reform, pension reform, and aging issues. These have to be solved in the 
near future. Furthermore, Korean society should also find appropriate solutions to obtain 
sustainable financial resources for growing population aging. Thus, these issues will be 
discussed in this report below. 
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III. ANALYSIS: COMPARATIVE STUDIES BETWEEN KOREA AND SWEDEN 
 
A. KOREA 
1. Welfare: Child-Care 
The President Park claimed universal welfare service. She extended child-care service to 
every child below 5 years old regardless of parents’ income level. The basic concept is that 
the country takes care of every child to overcome low fertility rate instead of parents while 
introducing free-care concept and home-care allowances, but the effectiveness of this policy 
is questionable. 
 
No careful consideration for Double-Income Families 
Yang claimed that the government could not carefully consider double-income families, 
the core of the policy. They have been discriminated against, and this policy cannot 
contribute to increasing women participation in labor force and improving the low birth rate. 
Working mothers should have high priority to get public child-care service when we consider 
the limited resources in Korea. Moreover, most Korean day-care centers prefer full-time 
mothers because they usually use short-term child-care services. Thus, working mothers 
cannot get service of public day-care centers due to the lack of public facilities. In contrast, 
full-time mothers in Sweden, in the early days following childbirth, cannot have benefit of 
public child-care service, but recently they can use only 14 hours per week. 
 
Wrong policies for infants aged 0, forcibly sending them to Day-care Centers 
    Yang pointed out that the government invests monthly 800,000 won to parents or day-
care centers to take care of infant aged less than 12 months. In Sweden, the baby aged 0 is not 
the candidate of public day-care. The Swedish government considers that every infant needs 
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to be raised by parents. Swedish parents are entitled to 480 days per child as maternity leave 
or parental leave, and they receive paid leave as a subsidy. The reason is that toddlerhood is 
very important to get mother’s care and love in Sweden.  
 
No System and Guideline to verify dual payment of Child-care Subsidy 
    In Korea, a mother who gets maternity leave can apply for public child-care service, 
Yang said. This means that a mother with a new-born baby can get 2 types of subsidy; one 
from workplace as paid leave, the other from the government as child-care subsidy or home-
care allowances. Dual payment is fundamentally prohibited in Sweden, but Korea tried to do, 
so even with insufficient government funding. Additionally, the parents with a child below 5 
years old can also get an income deduction in a year-end tax adjustment. 
 
Lacking Facilities and low quality of Child-care 
“Although Korea’s spending on ECEC per child significantly increased from 2003 to 
2007, the international comparison highlights that it is still far below Nordic countries focus 
public spending in early years of childhood [(Figure 2, Panel B)].”40  In pre-primary 
education, Korea shows the highest expenditure (52.7%) in private educational institutions 
while OECD average is 18.3%. Moreover, the public spending in Korea is less than 50%: the 
lowest at 42.6% (Figure 3). Thus, most working mothers cannot find relevant child-care 
centers and they also have a higher financial burden. 
 
OECD stated that the responsibilities of ECEC in Korea “are split between two 
ministries: kindergarten is administered by the Ministry of Education, Science and 
                                                          
40 OECD.2013a, “Strengthen Social Cohesion in Korea,” OECD Publishing, (2013):200.  
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Technology (MEST) and child care by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW).”41 
Therefore, the regulation and curricula including different standards for the staff at child-care 
centers and kindergarten are not same because of two different Ministries. “The split 
administrative system further hinders the transparency of ECEC in Korea.”42 
 
Figure 2. Average social expenditure by child by intervention as a proportion of median 
working-age household income, 200743 
 
Source: OECD (2011), Doing Better for Families, OECD Publishing, Figure 2.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Ibid., 184. 
42 Ibid., 185. 
43 “Finland is selected as a reference country for comparison as Korea often compares its policy inputs with 
Finland‟s to identify different approaches to producing similar outcomes, such as on students achievements on 
the PISA assessments.”, Ibid., 200. 
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 Figure 3. Distribution of public and private spending on early educational 
institutions44 
 
Source: OECD (2012), Education at a Glance 2012: OECD Indicators, Tables B3.2a and 
B3.2b. 
 
2. Welfare: Health-care 
Universal Health-Care and previous Health-care Reform 
After the first introduction of National Health Insurance (NHI) in 1977, Korea extended 
public health care service to all Koreans in 1989. Everyone must insure NHI system while 
paying monthly insurance premium depends on his/her income or property level. Nowadays, 
everyone can receive public health-care service everywhere, but the cost-effectiveness is not 
satisfied people expected. About 90% medical facilities belong to the state in Sweden, but 
                                                          
44 “Note: Countries are ranked in descending order of the proportion of public expenditure on educational 
institutions in pre-primary education. a) Some levels of education are included with others. b) Unweighted 
average of the 27 member countries shown in the chart above for ‘Public expenditure on educational 
institutions’; ‘All private sources, including subsidies for payments to educational institutions received from 
public sources’ equals 100 minus the average previously described.” OECD.2013a, “Strengthen Social Cohesion 
in Korea,” OECD Publishing. 
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Korea shows the opposite trend – about 90% is private medical facilities. NHI itself could not 
guarantee the whole coverage of health care, even though Korea also had well developed 
NHI system like Sweden. 
 
In 2000, the Korean government did the Separation Reform in health care to promote 
specialization. The initial aim of this reform was “to reduce the over-use of drugs, improve 
the quality of care, expand patients’ rights to information and raise the efficiency of the 
pharmaceutical industry.” However, the government forcibly modified “the planned reform in 
favour of physicians’ right” because of the physicians’ strikes. NHI was in financial crisis in 
2001-02 because of 49% increase of medical fees to reimburse physicians’ income loss.45 On 
the one hand, while cancer, chronic diseases, and elders’ disease especially over 65 were still 
increasing, financial burden of NHI is sharply increasing. 
 
Sharply increase of medical cost due to free Health-care for people with four critical 
diseases 
In last presidential election, the President Park stated extension of health-care for people 
who have four critical diseases – cerebrovascular and cardiac disorders, cancer, and terminal 
illnesses – and can take free health-care service. This concept came from to protect people 
who cannot pay for tremendous medical cost due to critical diseases. In the beginning, the 
presidential transition team estimated that these diseases need 1.5 trillion won per year, but 
the real cost will be several fold increase because potential patients caused by free health-care 
service will sharply increase, according to Yang’s claim.  
 
Debate of the Expansion to DRG (Diagnostic Related Group) from Fee-For-Service 
                                                          
45 R. S. Jones(2010), “Health-Care Reform in Korea,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no. 797, 
OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmbhk53x7nt-en. 2010:13. 
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    DRG46 payment system was applied to about 2900 hospitals except general hospitals to 
reduce medical cost on July 1st, 2012, because many said that fee-for-service payment system 
has caused the increase of medical cost. OECD has recommended for Korea to change the 
payment system to DRG from fee-for-service. Jones (2010) in an OECD report pointed out 
that the fee-for-service system had two problems: (1) health care providers have induced 
unnecessary health-care treatment to increase profit; and (2) providers receive an incentive 
when they increase the intensity of services. For instance, the rate of caesarean deliveries in 
Korea was increased from 6% in 1985 to 36% by 2008, because the price is 1.5 times higher 
than for a normal delivery.47 
 
    However, the debate of pros and cons between DRG and fee-for-service was going on.  
The Korean Medical Association has pointed out the side-effects of DRG: Essential health-
care service might be reduced; medical institutions enforced patients to leave a hospital 
earlier; Complications and death rate might increase; medical centers might avoid treating 
patients with critical diseases; the quality of medical service will be lower. Moreover, Ryu 
announced on Feb. 25, 2013 that the DRG had no effect to reduce medical cost with recent 
study of Professor Kim, Jin-Hyun at SNU.48 
 
 
                                                          
46 DRG stands for “Diagnostic Related Group” and is a billing code. “In 2002, Korea introduced a DRG 
payment system on a voluntary basis for eight illnesses, which were chosen because of their high level of 
standardisation in treatment and low variation in costs. Together, they accounted for about a quarter of in-patient 
cases… A government study found that the DRG was successful in reducing medical costs by 14% and the 
length of hospital stay by 6%. The cost savings were achieved in part by cutting the number of tests, from 5.1 to 
3.8 per patient, and the use of antibiotics by 30%. The DRG also lowered the administrative cost of filing and 
processing claims for individual treatments.” Randall S. Jones (2010), “Health-Care Reform in Korea,” OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, no. 797, OECD Publishing, (2010):18, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmbhk53x7nt-en. 
47 Ibid., 17-18.  
48 Ryu, Jang-hun, “’정부 주장한 포괄수가제 장점 없었다’ 충격적 연구 보고서,” Raportian, Feb. 25, 
2013, http://www.rapportian.com/n_news/news/view.html?page_code=movie&no=10594&movie_theme=.  
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3. Welfare: Pension 
Rising concerns of exhaustion of Pension Fund by 2060 
    Korea’s Public Pension System (NPS) was implemented in 1988 and extended to include 
both farmers and fishermen in rural areas in 1995 and self-employed people in urban areas in 
1999. However, despite external growth, NPS still had serious structural problems “on the 
imbalance between generous benefits and low contribution rates since its introduction.” 
Moreover, NPS “faces long-term financial instability and intergenerational inequity problems 
due to an imbalance in the benefit-contribution structure and a rapidly aging population.”49  
The state made several amendments to alleviate the financial imbalance, but the structural 
framework of the existing scheme was maintained. In 2007 National Pension Act, the state 
included the introduction of the noncontributory Basic Old Age Pension System (Table 1). In 
addition, according to Moon’s journal article in 2009: 
in a way to rationalize and complement the National Pension Scheme, the 
government also included the introduction of the Military Service Credit System, 
which was designed to grant six months’ coverage to a person who has 
successfully finished his/her military service, and the Childbirth Credit System, 
designed to grant additional coverage to women who give birth to more than two 
children (Table 2).50  
 
    Moon showed the projection of the pension fund using “the long-term Actuarial Toolkit, 
a customized form of the World Bank’s Pension Reform Options Software Toolkit (PROST) 
Model” Following this assumption, Moon stated that “the financial deficit of the pension fund 
is likely to occur in 2035, 10 years later than the previously expected point of time.” Under 
                                                          
49 Hyungpyo Moon (2009), “Demographic changes and pension reform in the Republic of Korea,” ADBI 
working paper series, no.135, 2009:1-2. 
50 Ibid., 3. 
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the assumption without change, “the point of time when the fund runs out of money will be 
postponed by 15 years from 2045 to 2060.”51 Therefore, even though the time of pension 
exhaustion was postponed, the need of pension reform keeps increasing for financial 
sustainability and equity. Due to these reasons, insured cannot believe the NPS and these days, 
the number of withdrawals by volunteer insurers is sharply increased. According to the Howe 
et al. in the Aging of Korea, 7.2% working-age adults are available to support each elder in 
2007, and “that ‘support ratio’ is due to fall to 2.5 by 2030 and to 1.3 by 2050.” This means 
that only one Korean worker may support each retiree.52 
 
Table 1. Major Contents of the Amendment to the National Pension Act 
 
                                                          
51 Ibid., 6. 
52 Howe, “The Aging of Korea,” (2007):15. 
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Note: * Based on the amount of monthly benefit in the first year of pension payment against 
the recalculated average lifelong earnings of middle-income earners 
Source: Press Release from the Ministry of Health & Welfare (2007) 
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Table 2. Comparison of Financial Prospects before and after the Amendment  
 
Source: Demographic changes and pension reform in Korea, Moon (2009) Table 2. 
 
Fundamental and Structural Problem since Introduction 
NPS was designed with structural problems from its introduction due to ‘low 
contribution and high benefit.Furthermore, direction of public pension system depends on 
occupation: “the national pension, government employees[’] pension, military personnel 
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pension and private school teachers pension.”53 However, because all four pension schemes 
have similar structural problems with low contribution and high benefit, some of them are 
facing financial deficit. However, the tax rate (25%) of GDP in Korea is much lower than 
OECD average (34%) in 2010 and national deficit has kept increasing every year. In contrast, 
the Swedish government has covered the initial pension or guarantee pension to support low 
income pensioners with tax. However, the ratio of non-contributors like persons over 65 
reached 34.5% in 2009. Due to rapid population aging, the expenditure of basic old-age 
pension alone will take up 7.2~9.6% of GDP in 2050. When this will be financed by VAT, the 
tax rate (currently 10%) should go up to 21~29% by 2050, according to WB and KDI 
workshop in Washington DC in 2011.  
 
4. Fiscal and Tax Policy 
Rising needs to prepare long-term Fiscal Policy Framework 
    Korean national debt has quickly increased since the 1997-8 Asian crisis and recent 
Global Financial Crisis. Moreover, Korea is rapidly entering the condition of the Aged 
Society due to population aging. Therefore, government debt will further increase in the 
following years. However, “Korea may need to expand automatic stabilizers and reduce 
discretionary components in the government budget” because the Korean government has not 
prepared a long-term fiscal policy framework. Thus, financial resources for fiscal stimulus in 
the recent economic recession were usually large. Hong pointed out that: 
Under an administration with an expansionary bias, large discretionary 
components in the government budget may be particularly harmful for fiscal 
consolidation. Also, Korea has relatively small automatic stabilizers compared with 
                                                          
53 Hyungpyo Moon(2000), “The Korean Pension System: Current State and Tasks Ahead (draft),” KDI, 2000:1. 
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OECD economies. Automated changes in transfer payments, for example, would 
help expand Korea’s limited social safety net.54 
In contrast, Sweden in 2010 made long-term fiscal policy framework “to enhance fiscal 
sustainability and transparency” since economic crisis in the 1990s and the recent crisis.55 
 
Lower Contribution of Tax than OECD average 
OECD in 2013 projected that public social spending in Korea will increase “from 
around 9% of GDP to 22% by 2050 under current policies.”56 Korea has lower tax burden at 
25.1% of GDP than OECD average of 33.8% in 2010 (Table 3). Korea is facing several major 
challenges: to support “economic growth in the context of rapid population ageing and 
globalization;” to meet “the long-term need for additional revenue;” to cope “with widening 
income inequality and rising relative poverty;” and to improve the local tax system.57 
However, rapid population aging will put upward pressure on government spending. Direct 
taxes on households are lower at 3.6% of GDP than OECD average 8.4% in 2010. Social 
security payroll at 5.8% of GDP are also far below the OECD average at 9.5% in 2010, 
“reflecting relatively low contribution rates and weak compliance with the social insurance 
schemes.” 2013 OECD report states that: 
[t]he overall ‘tax wedge’ on labor, including income tax and social security 
contributions, was only 20% in 2010, the fourth lowest in the OECD area. Low 
taxes on labour contribute to high labour inputs in Korea, which are 37% higher 
                                                          
54 Kiseok Hong, “Fiscal policy issues in Korea after the current crisis,” ADBI working paper series, no. 225, 
2010:20. 
55 Government Offices. “The Swedish Fiscal Policy Framework.” March (2011:1). 
56 OECD.2013, “STRENGTHEN SOCIAL COHESION IN KOREA: Assessment and Recommendations 
(Preliminary version),” KDI-OECD Joint Conference on Korea’s social Policy Challenges, Seoul, 2013:58. 
57 R. S. Jones(2009), “Reforming the Tax System in Korea to Promote Economic Growth and Cope with Rapid 
Population Aging,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no. 671. OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/226518762318, 2009:6. 
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relative to the population than the United States, offsetting much of the 
productivity gap.58  
Low corporate income tax rates contribute to economic growth. However, direct taxes 
on household and firms and social security contributions in Korea increased during the 
decade 2000-10, “while the share in GDP of indirect taxes slightly declined. Therefore, “[t]he 
large rise in social spending expected for the coming 40 years should be financed through 
revenue increases.” These increased revenues “minimi[z]e the negative effect on growth.” 
Pro-growth tax policy limits “any increase in the tax wedge on labour income and keep[s] a 
low corporate tax rate.” Low indirect taxes calls for an increase in “indirect taxes, notably the 
value-added tax (VAT), which has a smaller negative effect on labour supply.” VAT at 
currently 10% in Korea is “far below the OECD average of 18%.” Raising revenue in VAT 
would be the best approach, following the OECD recommendation. Moreover, 
“environmental taxes and revenues from auctioning permits” are also good to increase 
revenue. National Tax System to collect social insurance contributions could be improved to 
enhance “transparency about income and compliance.”59  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 OECD.2013, “STRENGTHEN SOCIAL COHESION IN KOREA,” 2013:58. 
59 Ibid., 60. 
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Table 3. The tax mix in OECD countries 
Tax revenue, percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: OECD (2012), Revenue Statistics 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
 
5. The role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
Contribution of Korean CSOs 
Labor Unions (LO) under private sectors did not contribute to enhancing the Korean 
welfare system, but CSOs made a large contribution. In contrast, Swedish LO under the 
public sectors had a politically important role. The role of CSOs in Korea was started from 
democratic movement in 1980s. Since the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997-8, CSOs under the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration had crucial role to extend Korean the welfare system in several 
arenas from the reform of the NPS, NHS, and Maternity Protection to the introduction of 
National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLS) and Welfare Budget Campaign. 60 
Compared to the state, CSOs are so much closer to the general citizens that the partnership 
between the state and CSOs keeps increasing. Moreover, thanks to the globalization and the 
development of information and communication technology (ICT), the role of the online 
                                                          
60 HyeKyung Lee, “Civil Society and Welfare Reforms in Post-Crisis South Korea,” Canda-Korea Social Policy 
Symposium II, Campell Conference Room, Munk Center, University of Toronto, January:2005:3. 
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community called ‘netizens’ is sharply increasing while blurring the border between online 
and offline.  
 
“Lawyers for a Democratic Society, the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy 
(PSPD), and the Citizen’s Coalition of Economic Justice (CCEJ)” are famous CSOs in 
Korea.61 CSOs were mostly led by younger generations who 
emphasized progressive advocacy functions including efforts to broaden public 
debate and participation in the formulation of public policy, safeguard or expand 
the domain of human rights and safeguard public resources such as the 
environment from the pressures of economic growth.62  
“[M]any scholars say that the decade of the 1990s in Korea was ‘the age of civil society.’” 
The Korean NGO Times (2001) stated that 56.5% of all CSOs “are established in the 1990s 
and 21% in the 1980s while only 9% were created in the 1970s.” The most three dominant 
public interest groups are education, research, and social welfare institutions. In general, 
“service-providing institutions are dependent on government support.”63  
 
    Another accountability function of CSOs is monitoring corruption, which is mostly 
“widespread in the government and among political elites.”64 There are several reasons for 
CSOs to combat corruption in 1990s: 1) lack “either political will or effective anti-corruption 
strategy and programs” of the governments and political parties; 2) the need for monitoring to 
support anti-corruption movement; 3) the rapid expansion of citizen groups and the growth of 
their political influence. “[W]henever there was an important national issue, CSOs made 
                                                          
61 Cameron Lowry, “Civil Society Engagement in Asia: Six Country Profiles,” East-West Center, Honolulu, 
Asia Pacific Governance and Democracy Initiative (AGDI), July(2008:17). 
62 Ibid., 17. 
63 Ibid., 18-9. 
64 Ibid., 17. 
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coalitions, “and anti-corruption groups were able to solicit the support and solidarity of other 
areas of civic groups.”65 Politically, CSOs “played a powerful role in the general elections in 
2000 and 2004” through nation-wide election campaign.66  
 
 
B. SWEDEN 
1. Welfare: Child-Care 
Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) in Sweden 
    ECEC in Sweden has become critical part of family policy to connect labor market 
policy because Sweden has achieved two kinds of goals: an increase in women’s labor force 
participation and a higher birth rate. 67 The report of National Commission on Child Care in 
1968 mentioned that Sweden could accomplish child development and learning, and growth 
of good conditions through high quality activities. This was the starting point to expand 
ECEC system and became national level policy through regular discussions and reports. 
“ECEC has [thus] been closely related to educational issues” and “[t]he pedagogical culture 
of the pre-school has developed over a lengthy period.” In 1993, “[t]he office of the 
Children’s Ombudsman was set up with the task of monitoring children’s rights.” ECEC was 
been taken over the Ministry of Education Science from the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs on 1st July 1996. The important goals of ECEC was reinforced “democracy, equality, 
solidarity, and responsibility,” after transition to the educational sector.68 Korpi stated, 
                                                          
65 Jong-Sung You, “The Role of Civil Society in Combating Corruption in Korea,” 11th International Anti-
Corruption Conference, Seoul, Korea, May(2003:3). 
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In August 1998 a national curriculum for the Swedish preschool came into force. 
This curriculum covers goals and guidelines for the activities of children 1-5 years 
of age in pre-school.69  
Every child aged 4-5 was entitled to yearly 525 hours to attend free pre-school in 2003 and 
expanded to include 3 year olds. In 2001, OECD adopted ECEC as a child-care model for 
other countries. 
 
Transition of ECEC system to Educational Sector 
    The responsibility of the ECEC in Korea should be taken over the Ministry of Education 
(MoE) from the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the MoE should make curriculum for 
ECEC activities including foreign language training to protect the increase of private tutoring 
cost. OECD estimated that the Swedish ECEC model was very successful to encourage 
women’s participation in the labor market, to increase fertility rate, and to contribute to child 
development. OECD in 2001 introduced ECEC to other countries. ECEC is strongly related 
to educational issues. The educational role of ECEC was reinforced since the transition to the 
educational sector in July 1996. After the name was changed to pre-school from child-care 
center, the Swedish government established a national curriculum for preschool in August 
1998. This curriculum was distributed to every Swedish preschool as guidelines for the 
activities of children aged 1-5. The government should keep monitoring for preschool to 
connect to public school naturally. In Sweden, every child aged 3-5 is entitled to attend free 
preschool yearly for 525 hours. However, considering most local governments in Korea are 
confronting the condition of fiscal cliff, governmental leaders must reform gradual extension 
of free pre-school depending on parent’s income level, parent’s employment status, or child 
age. Moreover, the introduction of an organization for motoring system like Swedish 
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Children’s Ombudsman is necessary to maintain the quality of preschool’s curriculum to 
prevent waste of state resources.  
 
Introduction of Parental Leave Insurance for Child-care 
Sweden introduced parental leave to replace maternity leave and to improve child well-
being and economic independence for women in 1974. On the basis of the family policy 
reform, there were democratic goals – gender equality and full employment. With the 
extension of parental leave, Swedish parents could rear their children at home while receiving 
financial support from the state or workplace for sixteen months. It has contributed to a 
higher fertility rate and women’s labor force participation than other European countries. 
 
Parental leave at first “comprised six months of leave per child,” extended to nine 
months in 1978, and nowadays extended to paid leave of 480 days per child. The childcare 
system actually expanded during a severe economic crisis in the 1990s. 70 Today, according 
to Earles, 
[Parental leave] system offers parents 13 months of leave per child at an 80 
percent income replacement rate, with an additional three months available at a flat 
rate. The total of 16 months currently available to parents includes two months 
reserved for mothers and two months reserved for fathers, leaving 12 months to be 
divided as the parents wish.71 
The parental leave system has encouraged women’s labor force participation and has 
brought negative consequences as well “[b]ecause women take the majority of parental leave” 
and employers should hire new employees. This has resulted in discrimination against 
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women. Thus, one proposal in 2005 was debated: paid parental leave should be increased to 
15 months – five months for a mother, five months for a father, and five months depending on 
parents’ wish.72 
 
Introduction of Home-care Allowance in 2008 
Sweden introduced a home-care allowance system for children aged 1-3 who did not 
enroll in public pre-school in 2008, but it brought some negative effects. It made women stay 
at home and weakened economic independence of women. It did not encourage men’s role in 
childrearing, and has limited women’s role to traditional child rearing as women’s work. 
Finally, it did not encourage gender equality and caused discrimination. Only one third of 
Swedish municipalities have adopted this policy. This allowance “is becoming more popular 
with immigrant women who face greater labour market marginalization,” not Swedish-born 
parents. This was becoming another social issue to bring potential “segregation and isolation 
among immigrant communities in Sweden.”73 
 
2. Welfare: Health-Care 
Universal Medical and Health-Care 
    The Swedish health system offers universal health care services and public expenditures 
for all Swedes based on three basic principles: “human dignity, need and solidarity, and cost-
effectiveness.”74 The Swedish welfare system emphasizes equal rights to all human beings. 
All Swedes have access good health care with “[t]he Health and Medical Services Act of 
1982.” Sweden has three governmental levels: “the national government, the 21 county 
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councils and regions, and the 290 municipalities.”75 The Swedish government “is responsible 
for overall health policy.” The county councils and regions are responsible for “funding and 
provision of services” and the municipalities have responsibilities “for the care of older and 
disabled people.” The major funding comes from tax (80%), close to “9.9% of gross domestic 
product (GDP)” in 2009. Everyone under aged 20 receives free of charge medical and health 
care service. However, private expenditure is about 17% of total funding. The state is obliged 
to pay minimum charge for patients to protect from moral hazard. The state is applying the 
guidelines of maximum expenditures to protect patients’ financial burden. More human 
resources in Sweden are allocated “to the health sector than most OECD countries.”76 The 
quality level of Swedish health care service is much higher than other European countries. 
 
    The Swedish health system has three main agents - the government as a purchaser, 
hospitals as providers of health care services, and patients. Therefore, the state has the 
ownership of most university hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and drug stores. The 21 
county councils/regions and 290 municipalities have the contract for health-care services with 
providers. Providers receive service charges for patients from the 21 county councils/regions 
and 290 municipalities. The main source of about 80% of these service charges is tax and the 
state can offer free health care service for all Swedes. 
 
Patient-oriented Health-care System, Stockholm Model 
One important factor in Swedish health-care reform is that the financial burden of 
patients is not increased and every system is designed as patient-oriented. The health care 
model in Stockholm in 1990s known as ‘Stockholm Model’ was successful and this model 
was applied to all Swedish county councils and regions. The funding is still provided by the 
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county councils but private individuals or companies could provide health care services to 
deal with the growing quality issue of health-care service. In applying this model, the state 
has achieved several aims: to improve the quality of health care service, to extend patients’ 
rights and autonomy to choose hospitals, to save national financial resources, not to increase 
patient’s financial burden, and to privatize the operating system partially with the 
introduction of a competitive system.  
    With the privatization of the health care system, Sweden has reduced the waiting times 
of services and improved access to providers. Patients have been protected with the 
introduction of the annual high-cost regulation policy in medical care, inpatient cost, and 
prescription cost. The cost-effectiveness has been improved.  
 
Policies to protect Moral Hazard 
    Sweden has focused on removing ineffectiveness in medical and health care reform. 
Several policies were applied to protect from moral hazard in the health care system. 
Minimum charge to patients is one of them except Swedes under 20 ages who receive 
services free of charge. Secondly, the state has introduced strengthened sick leave policies 
since 1991. Employee, employer, and NSIB (National Social Insurance Board) must share the 
expenses of the financial loss occurred during sick leave of employees or workers. The main 
agent for responsibility about the loss of sick leave depends on the number of days: the first 
day to the employee; between the second day and fourteenth day to the employer; the other 
days to NSIB.77 Lastly, the state has strengthened its rehabilitation program to minimize 
persons caused by disease since 1990. NSIB is responsible for overall management and 
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supervision for rehabilitation. Employers have the first responsibility for their workers’ 
rehabilitation program.78  
 
3. Welfare: Pension 
Introduction of Radical Change from defined benefit to Notional Defined Contribution 
In 1999, Sweden introduced radical pension reform after passing pension legislation in 
1998 from ‘defined benefit’ to ‘Notional Defined Contribution (NDC)’ – a defined 
contribution plan financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, and entirely applied since 
January 2003. Pension reformers had an objective “to design a fiscally sustainable pension 
system tied to economic growth with a clear link between contributions and benefits,” and 
wanted that contribution rate of NDC could remain unchanged in the long run.” NDC as a 
public and mandatory system was “financed primarily on a pay-as-you-go basis but with a 
funded component.” “The new public pension system consists of three components: income 
pension, premium pension, and guarantee pension.”79 Under new NDC system: 
the income pension will replace the current earnings-related pension. The income 
pension will be a defined contribution scheme with a contribution rate of 18.5 
percent: 16 percent of earnings will be credited to a “notional” account and the 
remaining 2.5 percent will be contributed to an individual account. The retirement 
age will be flexible; benefits can be paid out starting at age 61, and at retirement 
the account balance will be converted to an annuity. Benefits will be indexed to life 
expectancy for successive cohorts of retirees. For individuals with no or low 
pensions, the pension system will provide a guarantee pension. Unlike the current 
flat-rate benefit, the guarantee pension will be means-tested and offset by the 
income pension. The guarantee pension replaces the current FP benefit and pension 
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supplement. It will be payable only from age 65. The guarantee pension will be 
funded completely from general tax revenues (Figure 4).80  
 
Figure 4. Swedish Pension System 
 
 
Source: The Swedish Pension System and the Economic Crisis, Dec(2009) 
 
The new NDC reform was done because “[t]he old Social Security system provided a 
flat rate benefit to ensure income security in old age and a supplementary old-age pension to 
provide an earnings related pension.” In addition, the old Social Security system had some 
problems: 1) “sensitive to changes in economic growth81;” 2) “principle of competition for 
loss of income had eroded82;” 3) “unsystematic and inequitable distribution of contributions 
and benefits83;” 4) “labor market distortions.”84 In the long run, NDC will contribute to 
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achieve financial stability85 and fairness and redistribution (Figure 5).86  
 
Figure 5. Compare between FP and NDC 
Flat Pension (FP) Notional Defined Pension (NDC) 
  
 Source: Strong Welfare Country, Sweden written by Takayoshi 
 
Strong Support of the Swedish Government 
Sweden took at least about ten years to prepare current the NDC (Notional Defined 
Contribution) concept and principles in the 1990s. As other OECD countries, Sweden should 
strongly need to reform its pension system due to population aging and economic crisis in 
1990s. Thus, the Swedish government appointed a group to prepare a proposal for pension 
reform in 1991The proposal prepared the group needed broad political support to insulate 
against future changes and collective agreements. “The proposal was presented in 1994 and 
[was] passed in principles by Parliament” in 1998. “The design of the Swedish system is new 
and, following Sweden, several other countries have adopted similar systems.”87  
 
    In the NDC system, the responsibility of individuals is more important for retirement 
planning and preparation. Thus, information and education become more crucial in the NDC 
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blurred because of the offset between the income pension and the guarantee pension… At the same time, the 
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system. “In order to inform and educate the population about the new pension system, the 
National Social Insurance Board (NSIB) launched a large information campaign during 1999.” 
Thus, every Swedish citizen received “information materials with an annual statement of 
expected pension benefits.”88  
 
4. Fiscal and Tax Policy 
Sustainable and transparent Fiscal Policy 
In 2010, Swedish Government submitted a Government Communication, “Fiscal Policy 
Framework” as the political decision making process, to the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) 
“to enhance fiscal policy sustainability and transparency by institutionalizing important 
principles” after passing the 2010 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, which “would present a code of 
conduct for fiscal policy.” In the Communication, the Swedish “[g]overnment clarifies what 
the fiscal policy framework comprehends and how it is implemented” and focuses on making 
“central principles for measures of stabilization policy and for financial market interventions” 
including “principles for the central government budget process, budgetary goals and rules.” 
The state founded these principles “on the experience gained from the economic crisis in the 
early 1990s and the recent crisis.” The Communication also “includes important principles 
for openness and clarity in fiscal policy presentation.” Fundamentally, the state “intends the 
framework to increase knowledge about and support for the central principles used by the 
Government.” Therefore, it “contribute[s] to further enhancing the credibility of Sweden’s 
fiscal policy conduct and its long term sustainability” of public finances.89  
 
“The overall objective of fiscal policy is to create” much welfare “by promoting 
sustainable economic growth," redistribution, and stable resource utilization. “Fiscal policy 
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has several different goals and means,” which should be observed “to achieve long-term 
sustainability and transparency” through fundamental principles.90 On the one hand, “[i]n 
2007, the Government set up a fiscal policy council” to make “fiscal policy more transparent” 
and improve “external monitoring and evaluation.” 91  Furthermore, for “Government 
intervention in the financial markets to be effective,” it is important “to have a clear 
allocation of roles among authorities and clear principles for how public finances are to be 
safeguarded.” It is necessary in financial crises “for the Government to take special measures 
to promote financial stability and thereby prevent crisis.” For openness and clarity, “[t]he 
Government’s Annual Report contains an evaluation of the past budget year.” Besides, 
“[b]oth the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill and the Budget Bill contain forecasts for the coming 3-4 
years.”92 Long-term surveys and the assessments of the public finances are also to be 
supplemented at regular intervals for fiscal policy.  
 
Crucial role of 1991 Tax Reform and Swedish Tax Policy 
    Sweden passed a great tax reform in 1991, “often referred to as the Tax Reform of the 
Century.” The 1991 tax reform “was very ambitious, involving a combination of tax rate cuts 
and tax base broadening amounting to about 6 percent of GDP.” This reform was the 
remarkable result “of a long-term process of investigation.” This reform was “studied by 
various government committees involving academic tax experts, civil servants, politicians 
and representatives of the most important interest groups.” It was close to a remarkable 
revolution.93 This reform “introduced the blueprint that has now become known as the 
Nordic dual income tax which separates the taxation of capital income from the taxation of 
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other income.” This reform was done under the principles, neutrality and uniformity of 
taxation. The Value Added Tax (VAT) rate “on all (taxable) goods and services was [also] 
adopted” in a similar way. The Tax Reform of the Century “represented a bold experiment in 
tax policy based on a clear set of principles that led to a much more consistent system.” In the 
long run, this reform contributes to allocate resources “without sacrificing the goal of equity 
in taxation.” Since 1991, “[t]he introduction of an Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC] in 2007 
was an important innovation in the taxation of labour income” to stimulate labour force 
participation.94 Table 4 shows the change of the tax reform from 1989 to 1991 and 2008. 
Total tax revenue of GDP was cut from 53.7% in 1991 to 47.1 % in 2008: tax cut on personal 
income, social security contributions, payroll taxes, and property taxes.  
 
Table 4. Evolution of the Swedish tax structure since the tax reform of 1991  
(percent of total receipts) 
 1989 1991 2008 
Taxes on personal 
income 
39.3 33.5 29.4 
Taxes on corporate 
income 
3.8 3.5 7.0 
Social security 
contributions 
26.7 29.1 24.9 
Payroll taxes 2.5 3.5 8.4 
Property taxes 3.3 4.0 2.3 
Taxes on goods and 
services 
24.2 26.4 27.9 
  VAT 13.6 16.4 20.1 
  Excise taxes 10.6 10.0 7.8 
Miscellaneous taxes 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Share of taxes in 
GDP (percent) 
55.5 53.7 47.1 
Source: Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries (Source OECD). 
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5. The role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
Crucial role of Swedish Labor Union 
The Swedish welfare system and Labor Unions (LO) have politically contributed to 
make current the Swedish welfare model. There has been strong labor movement for several 
decades, while the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) has long dominated. Since the 
Second World War, strong centralized labor unions (thereafter LO) have primarily been 
“responsible for the sustaining of high labor solidarity,” and SAP also “tend[s] to give 
deference to LO and rarely take initiatives in formulating policies.” SAP has contributed “to 
implement labor-friendly policies” and foster cohesive labor forces. “Both high Levels of 
Labor Mobility (ILM) and strong centralized labor unions (LO) can make labor owners 
across industries become more coherent.”95  
 
“There are currently three major trade union confederations,” commonly known as the 
LO, in Sweden: 1) “the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige 
or LO);” 2) “the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens 
Centralorganisation or TCO);” 3) “and the Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Associations (Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation or SACO).” LO has had a crucial 
role for electoral support for SAP. In contrast, TCO and SACO as two major labor 
organizations did “not have official connections with any political parties in Sweden.” In 
mid-1980s, “about 40[%] of LO members belong to the [SAP] through their local unions.” 
On the one hand, the Rehn-Meidner model was presented in 1951 to Congress to involve with 
several objectives: 1) “wage policy of solidarity to achieve wage stability and structural 
change;” 2) “restrictive fiscal policy and active labor market policy to reduce overall profits 
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and promote labor mobility.”96 This model successfully contributed to “macroeconomic 
outcome of economic stability, full employment, rising standard of living and low budget 
deficits in Sweden.”97  
 
    The Social Democrats introduced three ways to deal with unemployment: restructure of 
the active labor market programs (ALMP) – introduction of the two programs, “Youth 
Practice Placement” and “Working Life Development Projects”; construction of individual 
strategies for job search activity; strengthen of the formal education due to “widening gap 
between rates of unemployment among workers of different skill levels.”98 Moreover, the 
agreement between LO and SAF contributed to lead “the push for equality, which was 
marked by a concerted drive to improve the relative wages of the low paid.”99  
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Korea must extend its welfare system due to rapid population aging, but the fundamental 
problem is how to obtain additional financial resources. This report showed what empirical 
studies were done through literature review. Most advanced countries already experienced 
many trials and errors creating a functional welfare system. For instance, Sweden took a long 
time, over one hundred years, to make the current mature welfare system while experiencing 
many trials and errors. Significantly, LO largely contributed to enhance the Swedish welfare 
model.  In contrast, the extension of Korean welfare has started since 1997-8 IMF crisis; 
thus the Korean welfare history is too short compared to Sweden. Therefore, if the Korean 
government would undertake many trials and errors, Korea might learn some lessons from 
Sweden. Furthermore, Korea should keep in mind that Sweden conducted several welfare 
policy reforms and it was essential to have a long-term plan and continuous discussions or 
debate with the public. Therefore, Korea must follow a gradual policy reform with a long-
term plan to mitigate social impact and should get social agreement from the people. In the 
analysis phase, this report showed the comparative study of policies between Korea and 
Sweden in several sectors: child-care, health-care, pension, fiscal policy, and the role of civil 
society. Lastly, there are some recommendations what Korea will need to fulfill welfare 
extension. 
 
In Child-Care Reform, firstly, Korea needs to transit its ECEC system to Educational 
Sector. OECD estimated that the Swedish ECEC model was very successful to encourage the 
women’s labor market, to increase the fertility rate, and to contribute to child development. 
On the one hand, ECEC is strongly related to educational issues. The educational role of 
ECEC was reinforced since the transition to the educational sector in July 1996. In Sweden, 
every child aged 3-5 is entitled to attend free preschool yearly for 525 hours. However, 
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considering most local governments in Korea have been confronting in the condition of fiscal 
cliff, governmental leaders must reform gradual extension of free pre-school depending on 
parents’ income level, parents’ employment status, or the child’s age. Moreover, the 
introduction of an organization for motoring system like the Swedish Children’s Ombudsman 
is necessary to maintain the quality of preschools’ curriculum to prevent waste of state 
resources. 
 
Secondly, the parental leave system for child-rearing should be gradually extended.     
The Korean government should gradually extend its parental leave system to increase the 
birth rate and women’s labor force participation with a long-term plan. The Swedish parental 
leave system was successful to increase these two goals at the same time. Nowadays, parents 
who give birth can use paid leave of 480 days for child-care – two months for a father, two 
months for a mother, and 12 months depending on parents’ wish. Moreover, the government 
should prohibit infants aged 0 from being sent to facilities and parents should raise their baby 
directly. It will contribute to raising the child’s emotional development and to protect the 
double subsidy of the state. In Northern European countries, it is common that infants aged 0 
should be raised by parents who use parental leave to take care of their baby directly. At the 
toddler stage, it is very important to obtain the awareness of six senses and to share feelings 
between baby and parents. In the life-cycle model, ECEC “is considered to play a critical role. 
A large body of empirical work, as well as neurological science research, has established that 
fundamental cognitive and non-cognitive abilities are created well before the age of five.”100  
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    Thirdly, home care allowance should be reconsidered, because Korea and Sweden have 
experienced negative consequences. ECEC was proved to develop child education, but some 
low income families chose the option to receive the home care allowance, not to send their 
child to child-care centers in Korea. In Sweden, the home care allowance did not contribute 
to encouraging gender equality and it made women stay at home for longer period. Therefore, 
it should be given to only infants aged 0 to set a sustainable welfare service. 
 
Fourthly, universal child-care policy should be reconsidered for sustainable financial 
status. The extension to the universal child-care service has not contributed to encouraging 
women’s labor market participation and fertility rate. Korea is rapidly entering the condition 
of an Aged society, and Korea’s workforce keeps going down. Therefore, the increase of 
fertility rate and women’s labor force participation is critical matter to cover the lack of 
workforce and to maintain sound and youthful Korean society for future. Moreover, the 
financial status of the Korean government is not sufficient to fulfill the welfare extension 
pledges of President Park. In contrast, most advanced countries including Sweden have 
reformed their welfare system from a universal welfare system to keep sustainable welfare 
service, because their financial resources were not sufficient.  
 
In Health-Care Reform, Korea rapidly faces growing health care costs, but cost-
effectiveness is low. Life expectancy in Korea was around 51 years in 1960, and increased to 
80.3 years in 2009, above the OECD average of 79.3. Besides, the fertility rate plummeted 
from 4.5 in 1970 to recently around 1.2, one of the lowest in the world. Longer life spans and 
risky health behaviors mean that most people are likely to have chronic diseases. It also 
means public health expenditure will sharply increase due to rapid population aging. 
Moreover, medical cost will rapidly increase due to free health care for people with four 
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critical diseases – one of the pledges of President Park. On the one hand, OECD has 
recommended for Korea to change the payment system to DRG (Diagnostic Related Group) 
from fee-for-service to reduce medical cost. However, the debate of pros and cons between 
DRG and fee-for-service is still going on. The state should carefully consider rising the 
financial burden of NHI.  
 
    Secondly, the state should consider financial burden of patients not to increase in health 
care reform. One important factor in Swedish health-care reform is that the financial burden 
of patients was not increased and every system was designed for patient-oriented health care, 
applying the Stockholm Model to all Swedish county councils and regions. Sweden has 
focused on removing ineffectiveness, and applied several policies to protect from moral 
hazard in medical and health care reform. A minimum charge to patients is one example. 
 
In Pension Reform, first of all, Korea needs to change to Notional Defined Contribution 
(NDC) like Sweden. In 1999, Sweden introduced radical pension reform, which consisted of 
income pension, premium pension, and guarantee pension. The guarantee pension will be 
funded completely from general tax revenues. In contrast, Korean NPS had serious structural 
problems since its introduction with the concept of ‘low contribution-high benefit,’ which 
was caused to bring rising concern of exhaustion of pension fund by 2060. Thus, Korean 
pension highly needs to change Swedish Notional Defined Contribution to draw the trust of 
the public, to change ‘high contribution-high benefit’, and to prepare the second oldest aging 
society with 38% of elders over 65 by 2050. 
 
    Secondly, the ratio of non-contributors should be reduced. In 2007, the state included 
the introduction of the noncontributory Basic Old Age Pension System including Military 
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Service Credit System and the Childbirth Credit System to NPS. These are mostly non-
contributed benefits that the expenditure of pension fund is continuously increasing. It causes 
long-term financial instability and intergenerational inequity problems in NPS and brings 
higher financial burden of future generations. Fortunately, on July 17, 2013 the state 
announced that the coverage for Basic Old Age Pension will be covered for 70~80% of low 
income elders by tax from July, 2014. However, the state should consider how to cut the ratio 
of non-contributors, over one third (34.5%) in 2009. 
 
    In Fiscal and Tax Reform, the state should prepare long-term Fiscal Policy Framework 
and carefully cope with the situation of rising public expenditure. Extending welfare services 
is inevitable as Korea is facing rapid population aging. However, the Korean government did 
not make a long-term fiscal policy framework like Sweden, because financial resources for 
fiscal stimulus in economic recession were usually large and automatic stabilizers were still 
lacking. In contrast, Sweden in 2010 prepared a Fiscal Policy Framework to enhance fiscal 
policy sustainability and transparency based on the experience since 1990s economic crisis 
and recent crisis. On the one hand, Korea has lower tax burden at 25.1% of GDP than OECD 
average at 33.8% in 2010. However, OECD in 2013 projected that public social spending in 
Korea will increase from current 9% to 22% of GDP by 2050. Low corporate income tax 
rates in Korea contribute to economic growth. However, direct taxes on households (3.6%) 
and social security payroll (5.8% of GDP) are lower than OECD average in 2010, even 
though these increased during the decade 2000-10. In contrast, the total share of indirect taxes 
in GDP slightly declined during the same period, 2000-10. Current VAT at 10% in Korea is 
lower than OECD average at 18%. Raising revenue in VAT and environmental taxes would 
be the best approach, following the OECD recommendation. A National Tax System to 
collect social insurance contributions could be also improved to enhance transparency about 
５３ 
 
income and compliance. 
 
In the role of Civil Society Organizations, Korean government should get public 
agreement from civil society actors through continuous discussion or debate, when the state 
reforms welfare policies. In Sweden, civil society actors like labor unions (LO) had a critical 
role to form the current welfare system. They made a large contribution to derive social 
agreement between the Swedish citizens and the central government through continuous 
discussions. In Korea, the contribution of CSOs largely was started from the movement of 
democratization in 1980s, and was extended in 1990s because they are much closer to the 
citizens. These days, the roles of civil societies are becoming more powerful, while the 
engagement in partnerships between civil society and business, government, or international 
organizations is becoming broad. 
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